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1960] RECENT CASES
inhere in the verdict itself.0 Conversely, affidavits are receivable when they
contain matters which do not inhere in the verdict7
In the instant case the affidavit was allowed to come in and as a result a
new trial was granted because the statement made by a juror during delibera-
tion was, to use the court's words, " . . . clearly a misstatement of law." This
case seems to reject, without mention, an earlier Texas decision wherein the
court held that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial even though
there was evidence of similar misconduct on the part of the jury. 8 These two
cases tend to indicate a Texas withdrawal from rigid adherence to the general
rule. As a matter of fact, the court in the instant case ruled that an affidavit
was admissible to show a misstatement of law during deliberation. This was
directly contrary to the general rule.0 Admitting an affidavit in such a
situation is a clear case of allowing into evidence matters which inhere in
the verdict.'0
North Dakota aligns itself with the majority and will not allow a juror
affidavit to impeach a verdict." Provision for the use of such an affidavit is
to be found in the Code, but then only where the verdict is determined by
chance. 1 - The statute is intended for use in civil cases and the North Dakota
courts have not yet determined its applicability in criminal cases. 13
To conclude, it would seem that the decision in the instant case, though
out of line with the general rule, insured the defendant a fair and impartial
trial. Courts faced with possible application of the exclusion rule in the future
would do well to bear this in mind.
DAVID ORSER
JURY - WAIVER OF RIGHT - IN CRIMINAL CASES. - Defendant was con-
victed of making or causing to be made certain material false statements on
behalf of a corporation to the state Commissioner of Securities for registration
as a dealer. The district court denied the motion for a new trial and defendant
appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota. Defendant alleged inter
alia, that the district court erred in refusing to try the case without a jury
when the defendant and the states attorney had waived a jury in open court
pursuant to the terms of a statute.1 The court, one justice dissenting, held
7. State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118 A.2d 812 (1955) "Where (the) jurors' testimony
goes. . .merely to the existence of conditions or the occurence of events hearing on the
verdict, that basis of policy does not exist, and this whether the condition happens or
the event occurs in or outside of the jury room."; Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 545 (1876)
Overt acts, that is, things which are open to the knowledge of all the jury, and not
simply within the personal conciousness of one, are admissible.
8. Salcido v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 319 S.W.2d 329 (1959).
9. See note 3 supra.
10 Ruffalo v. State, 196 Wis. 446, 220 N.W. 190 (1928) (defendants attempted use
o, juror affidavits to show that he was convicted due to erroneous jury belief that a guilty
verdict would result in leniency being shown toward him was excluded); Trimble v.
State, 118 Neb. 267, 224 N.W. 274 (1929) (an affidavit stating that jury disregarded
instructions and evidence would not be allowed) (dictum).
11. State v. Graber, 77 N.D. 645, 44 N.W.2d 798 (1950); State v. Forrester, 14 N.D.
335, 103 N.W. 625 (1905). "
12. N. D. Rev. Code § 28-1902, (2) (1943).
13. State v. Graber, 77 N.D. 665, 44 N.W.2d 798 (1950) (dictum).
1. N.D. ]Rev. Code §29-1602 (1943) "In any case, whether a midemeanor or felony, a
trial jury may be waived by the consent of the defendant and the state's, attorney expressed
in open court and entered on the minutes of the court. Otherwise, 'the issues of fact
must be tried by the jury."
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that it is not error for a trial court to deny a request by the defendant to be
tried by the court although both the defendant and the states attorney have
waived the trial jury pursuant to the Code provision. State v. Pandolfo, 98
N.W.2d 161 (N.D. 1959).
The Supreme Court here is undoubtedly following the majority rule in
the construction of the statute involved.2 There has, however, been much
criticism of the statutes and the construction, given them. The court in the
instant case and in many others cited therein3 defines waiver as "the voluntary
extinguishment or abandonment of a known existing right, advantage, benefit,
claim, or privilege which except for such waiver the party would have en-
joyed." The court goes on to say that the waiver of a right does not imply the
acquisition of a substitute or reciprocal right. This appears to be the point
involved in the vigorous criticism by the various authorities on the subject.
As stated by the dissenting justice in the instant case: "If it [the legislature]
gave to the accused the right to waive a trial by jury, it must have intended,
as a corollary, to then provide for trial by the court." If trial by the court
does not follow, then what is the purpose of the statute granting the right
to waiver? Blackstone 4 refers to trial by jury as "the most transcendent
privilege which any subject can enjoy," and Justice Story5 in speaking of a
trial by jury said: "when our more immediate ancestors removed to America,
they brought this great privilege with them . . . it is now incorporated into
all our state constitutions as a fundamental right .... ..
In the light of the foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude that the framers
of the Constitution simply were intent upon preserving the right of trial by
jury primarily for the protection of the accused. Thus the constitutional and
statutcry provisions were meant to confer a right upon the accused which he
may forego at his election. To deny his power to do so is to convert his
privilege into an imperative requirement.
In State v. Ross,e' the court said: "'Ve can see no more reason why a person
accused of a crime cannot waive his right to be tried by a jury of twelve and
submit his case to a jury of less number, than there is why he cannot waive
a jury altogether and plead guilty." In the case of In re Kortgaard,7 the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that the defendant in a criminal action may
waive his right to the service of counsel, the procurement of witnesses, or a
jury trial. The -court also stated: "If the constitutional provision, preserving the
right of trial by jury, was intended as a part of the frame of government,
and not as a guarantee to the accused, the accused could only be sentenced
upon the verdict of a jury, and every law authorizing a plea of guilty would
be unconstitutional. It is not necessary that the right to a trial by jury be
more than a guarantee to the accused, for so long as it is guaranteed it
remains inviolate. No power can take it away from him."
2. People v. Eubanks, 7 Cal. App.2d 588, 46 P.2d 789 (1935); Morrison v. State,
31 Okla. Crim. 11, 236 P.2d 901 (1925).
3. Kessler v. Thompson, 75 N.W.2d 172 (N.D. 1956); Sjoberg v. State Auto Ins.
Ass'n., 78 N.D. 179, 48 N.W.2d 452 (1951); Meyer v. National Fire Insurance Company,
67 N.D. 77, 269 N.W. 845 (1936).
4. 3 Sharswood's Blackstone's Commentaries 264 (1897).
5. 2 Story, Constitution § 1779.
6. 47 S.D. 188, 197 N.W. 234 (1924).
7. 66 N.D. 555, 267 N.W. 438 (1936); see also State v. Thompson, 56 N.D. 716,
219 N.W. 218 (1928); State v. Throndson, 49 N.D. 348, 191 N.W. 628 (1922); State
v. Layer, 48 N.D. 366, 184 N.W. 666 (1921).
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The author of an article in the Michigan Law Review,$ after noting that
some jurisdictions require only the consent of the accused, said: "the latter
procedure is more in accord with the underlying conception of the waiver
plan. If trial by jury, as we have been contending, is a protection for the
benefit of the individual, then it is hardly consistent to require also the
consent of the court, or the prosecuting attorney, or both, as a condition
precedent to a trial without a jury. The act of the legislature is itself consent
by the state; and there is a curious contrariety in calling a jury trial a privilege
and then making its surrender subject to the control of the court."
ALAN WARCUP.
SALES - CONTRACTS RELATING TO PERSONAL PROPERTY - EQUITABLE
SERVITUDES ON CHATTELS.- Plaintiff, in purchasing from carrier a quantity
of fruit salad which had been frozen in transit, contracted not to permit the
goods to enter retail outlets under the shipper-manufacturer's label. Later,
plaintifl", with the assistance of its' employee Ross, sold the goods to Vizcarra
with the invoice reciting the restriction. Subsequently, Ross terminated his
employment with plaintiff, purchased part of the goods from Vizcarra, sold
par' of the salad to a retailer, and indicated an intention to dispose of the
remainder without regard to the restriction imposed by the plaintiff. Plaintiff's
suit for injunctive relief in lower court was granted and the District Court of
Appeal in affirming held, the contract requirement was not in restraint of
trade, and that an equitable servitude on chattels was created thereby which
was enforceable against a person who subsequently acquired the chattels
with notice of the restriction, notwithstanding lack of privity between such
person and the dealer. Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, 346 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1959).
The rule is well settled that restrictive agreements relating to real property,
classed as equitable servitudes, are enforceable against subsequent purchasers
who take with notice of the restriction.' In De Mattos v. Gibson,2 broad
equitable principles were enunciated which seemed sufficient to allow the
desired enforcement to restrictions on chattels. There the court said: "Reason
and justice seem to prescribe that . . . where a man . . . acquires property
from another, with knowledge of a previous contract . . . the acquirer shall
no .. . use and employ the property in a manner not allowable to the giver
0 seller .... .. It was thought that these servitudes would receive judicial
approval, but in England, such restrictions were held binding on subsequent
purchasers with notice only when imposed on patented articles.3 This view
became more entrenched in England with one noteworthy exception decided
on equitable servitude principles.
4
8. Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 695,
736 (1927).
1. Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774, 1 H. & Tw. 105, 18 L.J. Ch. 83, 13 L.T. (O.S.)
21, 13 Jur. 89, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848); 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 5th ed.
1941.) 954; McClintock, Equity 213 (1936). See also, Schmidt, Equitable Servitudes .n
Colorado, 33 Dicta 236, 237 (1956).
2. 4 De G. & J. 276, 45 Eng. Rep. 108, 110 (C.A. 1858).
3. Werderman v. Societe' Generale d'Electricite', 19 Ch.Div. 246 (1881); National
Phonograph Co. of Australia v. Menck, A.C. 336 (1911).
4. Lord Stratheona Steamship Co. v. Dominion Coal Co., A.C. 108 (1926) (The purchaser
with notice was enjoined from using a ship in a manner inconsistent with the charter
contract entered into by the original owner and the charter party).
